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Abstract
Data from political elections provide a snapshot of the political landscape of a country
or region. This snapshot is filtered, and maybe also distorted, through the lens of the voting
method in place. The standard Plurality Voting method, by virtue of asking every voter
to report only the maximum of his or her preferences, might provide too little data for an
accurate snapshot. We analyze data from two large-scale field experiments in Germany,
where voters employed Approval Voting for both parties and candidates. The analysis
reveals that the underlying political landscapes, as perceived by the voters, are inherently
multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a single left-right dimension, or even to a
two-dimensional space. We compare the obtained representations with those derived from
party positions as revealed by the ‘Wahl-o-Mat’ voting advice application, and further
compare the results with those of the W-Nominate procedure.
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1 Introduction
The results of a given political election provide more than a mere ranking of the alternatives
(be them parties or candidates). They oﬀer a detailed picture of the political opinion of a
country, state, or community, which can be taken as a snapshot of the opinion landscape of a
democratic society at a speciﬁc point in time. This picture is, however, ﬁltered by the voting
method in use. It is well known that, for exactly the same electorate, diﬀerent voting methods
might well produce diﬀerent results (see e.g. Saari, 1994). Voting methods also diﬀer in the
kind and amount of additional information that political science researchers might obtain from
them, and how accurate and detailed the produced snapshots are. When considering the merits
of diﬀerent voting methods, this informational aspect is not usually taken into consideration.
Before turning to the diﬀerences in methods, let us consider the snapshots ﬁrst. In spatial
models of party or candidate competition, policies or platforms are represented geometrically
as points in a k-dimensional Euclidean space, k ∈ N, the ‘political space’. Its dimensions
correspond to the diﬀerent issues the electorate consider important. Each voter is assumed to
have a most preferred policy or ideal point within this space. A voter’s utility for a policy
declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point (see Davis et al., 1970;
McKelvey, 1976; Enelow and Hinich, 1990).
How many issues or dimensions should be employed? In a further simplifying step, the-
oretical models often concentrate on a single, left-right dimension. For instance, Harrington
and Hess (1996) investigate a two-candidate, unidimensional policy space model in which a
candidate can inﬂuence voters’ perceptions of her own ideology and the opponent’s perceived
ideology (positive and negative campaigning). In a similar setting, Bernhardt et al. (2009)
show that if parties do not know voters’ preferences precisely, voters ex ante strictly prefer
symmetrically diﬀerentiated platforms over platform convergence at the median. The analysis
in these and many other papers rests on the assumption of unidimensionality.
Given the theoretical and descriptive relevance of such models, estimating the positions
of candidates/parties and the dimensionality of the political space have become important
empirical tasks in political science. Diﬀerent approaches exist, including mass surveys of voters
(e.g. van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009), analysis of roll call data, i.e the recorded votes of
deliberative bodies by means of nominate scores (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991; Jenkins,
1999; Londregan, 1999), analysis of hand-coded content of party manifestos (e.g. Budge et al.,
2001) and expert surveys of country specialists (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2007). A notable example
is Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), who estimated the policy positions of parties and presidents
of 18 Latin American countries based on expert surveys. Experts provided numerical estimates
(on a scale from 1 to 20, where lower points represent typical left and higher numbers represent
typical right positions) on up to 11 exogenously predetermined primary dimensions of policy
as well as on a general left-right dimension for both parties and presidents. Factor analysis
revealed that political contestation can be reduced primarily to a single dimension composed
of (as indicated by factor loadings) classical issues that distinguish ‘left’ from ‘right’ positions;
more speciﬁcally, the main dimension explains up to 44% of the variance. This particular
study could be taken as evidence that, although political spaces are multi-dimensional, a one-
dimensional approach might still be often admissible.
Suppose, however, that we concentrate on data originating from voters, rather than experts.
Hence, we are aiming to estimate the political landscape as it is perceived by the agents who will
ultimately take the relevant voting decisions. This might of course diﬀer from the actual policy
positions, but it is easy to argue that this space is highly relevant for political analysis. Further,
as we will discuss below, this approach has the advantage that the number of dimensions to be
used in the representation is endogenous, determined by the data, and not exogenously ﬁxed.
Voter data is invariably generated according to variants of ‘one man, one vote’ systems, the
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most applied voting systems in contemporary democracies. These systems (including Plurality
Voting) share the basic feature that voters are asked to provide a minimal quantity of infor-
mation, namely the name of a candidate and/or the name of a party. Even with the entire set
of cast ballots, the information we receive is of limited use for further analysis. In contrast,
methods that ask voters to provide a full ranking of the alternatives or that allow voters to
cast votes for more than one alternative, such as the Borda Count (see e.g. Saari, 1994) or
Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Laslier and Sanver, 2010), oﬀer a richer picture
of the political landscape.
We consider the latter method. Under Approval Voting, each voter is allowed to vote for (or
“approve of”) as many candidates as wished. This method has been defended on both theoretical
(see Fishburn, 1978a,b; Alós-Ferrer, 2006) and empirical grounds (see Brams and Fishburn,
2005). Its proponents argue that it provides a more accurate reﬂection of voter wishes by virtue
of collecting more information from voters in an easy-to-understand way. Further, voters lack
incentives to misrepresent their preferences. For instance, the “wasted vote eﬀect” disappears:
even if a small party has little perceived chances of winning the election, its supporters can still
approve of it without losing the possibility to approve of other parties. Additionally, Approval
Voting is more likely to lead to a consensus vote, reducing both electorate polarization and
the risk of ‘smear campaigns’, because the candidates depend on voters who also support other
political parties. Due to these properties, Approval Voting has been adopted by a large number
of scientiﬁc and professional associations across the world, as e.g. the Econometric Society, the
Game Theory Society, and the Social Choice and Welfare Society.
For our purposes, the key advantage of approval data is that we can identify similarities
between the available alternatives simply by counting the diﬀerent constellations of parties
or candidates voters approved of simultaneously, which is impossible under Plurality Voting.
Based on this observation, Laslier (2006) developed the theory of Spatial Approval Voting.
This article showed that, in the context of a probabilistic theory of voting,1 the information
structure of the Approval Voting ballots suﬃces for a spatial representation of the parties and
candidates. That is, the locations of the parties and candidates in the ‘political’ space are solely
and endogenously determined by the correlations that we observe from the Approval Voting
ballots.
All theoretical developments, however, remain of little use without an actual data set.
Although no political elections are currently run under Approval Voting, a close substitute
exists. Recently, a number of empirical studies have tested the performance of Approval Voting
in the ﬁeld, by conducting large-scale ﬁeld experiments during actual elections, i.e. installing
parallel booths where voters were able to cast a second, hypothetical vote according to the
Approval Voting method. The ﬁrst such experiments took place during the French Presidential
Elections in 2002 (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008) and 2007 (Baujard and Igersheim,
2010), followed by two experiments in Germany during the 2008 State Elections in Hesse and
the 2009 Federal Elections (Alós-Ferrer and Granić, 2010, 2012). The lessons learned from these
experiments are varied. The bottom line, however, is that Approval Voting seems to deliver a
more accurate snapshot of the voters’ preferences than currently employed methods.
The present article undertakes two tasks. First, we estimate actual political landscapes
using approval data from the 2008 and 2009 ﬁeld experiments conducted by Alós-Ferrer and
Granić (2010, 2012). Due to the particularities of the German electoral system, each election
included a vote for parties and a separate vote for local candidates. Hence, the data set includes
four elections taking place against a very similar political backdrop. Using the model in Laslier
(2006), we obtain low-dimensional representations of the involved political landscapes. The
question on the back of our minds was, “how low-dimensional can we go”. Our analysis of
1To be more precise, if a random utility model (see e.g. Anderson et al., 1992) is applied to the spatial theory
of voting.
3
the data generated by these experimental elections under Approval Voting, however, point
towards a relatively high dimensionality of the political space. The multidimensionality of
these snapshots could not be obtained under methods such as Plurality Voting, which delivers
too little information.
The second task we undertake is to obtain comparable political landscapes based on party-
provided data. To this end, we follow a relatively new approach (e.g. Tangian, 2013) and analyze
the responses provided by parties to the German online voting advice application “Wahl-O-Mat”.
We show that this kind of data can be analyzed using the same estimation technique of Spatial
Approval Voting. This accomplishes two objectives. First, we obtain a data set which can be
analyzed simultaneously with Spatial Approval Voting and the well-established W-NOMINATE
scaling procedure (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991; Poole et al., 2011). A comparison of the
two resulting representations allows us to cross-validate our ﬁndings. Second, this kind of
party-generated, issue-based data allows for a comparison of the estimation results with the
existing (theoretical) literature on German party politics, hence enabling us to identify the main
cleavages that we would expect to observe from the point of view of the running parties. In
turn, the comparison with the representation obtained from approval data allows us to identify
to which extent the judgments of the voters meet these predictions.
In line with previous ﬁndings, we identify two main dimensions of contestation in Germany
when analyzing Wahl-O-Mat data, i.e. party-revealed positions (see e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006;
Linhart and Shikano, 2009). This ﬁnding is robust in the changes of the estimation technique
and is obtained under both Spatial Approval Voting and W-NOMINATE. Nonetheless, we
identify important diﬀerences between the representations based on voting data and party-
revealed positions. We conclude that voters are more likely to be driven by political traditions
than by actual political proﬁles of the parties and are more likely to overvalue ‘wedge’ issues
stressed by smaller parties.
Previous research on public opinion established that structuring citizens’ opinions requires
more than one dimension (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug
and van Spanje, 2009). However, many studies show that party choice is often driven by a
single, left-right dimension (e.g., Oppenhuis, 1995; Van der Eijk et al., 1999). The argument
reconciling these two observations is that, when casting a vote for a party, even voters who care
about a number of political issues might be constrained to choose the closest party on the left-
right spectrum (Sartori, 1976). However, the validity of this argument might crucially depend
on the electoral system in use. The multidimensionality of our representations originates from
actual voter choices among parties under approval voting. Our analysis suggests that, if the
true political space is multidimensional and cannot be fruitfully reduced to, say, a single left-
right dimension, the voting method used to generate the data needs to provide a rich enough
structure for the researcher to be able to observe the multidimensionality.
2 The Data Set
We rely on data collected in two large-scale ﬁeld experiments in Germany (Alós-Ferrer and
Granić, 2010, 2012), which (in cooperation with state and federal authorities) took place during
actual elections. That is, participants were voters who had just cast their votes in an oﬃcial
election and were invited to cast their vote again according to the Approval Voting method.
The method allows voters to vote for (or approve of) as many alternatives as wished. The
alternative with the most approvals is declared the winner. Approval Voting can be easily
reformulated in terms of a series of yes/no question, where voters independently evaluate each
feasible alternative as acceptable (approved of) or not, comparable to multidimensional roll call
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voting, where each dimension or issue represents a diﬀerent alternative.2 Except for the method,
the oﬃcial election was mimicked as closely as possible, from setting up the experimental polling
stations within the same buildings as the oﬃcial polling stations, to listing the same alternatives
in the same order as in the oﬃcial election.
A particularity of German federal elections, and most of the state ones, is that voters are
asked to cast two diﬀerent votes. The ﬁrst, for the district election, is given to a candidate,
and the results are determined by the winner-takes-all procedure with simple majority. We
will refer to this ﬁrst vote as the “Constituency Vote”. Half the seats in the parliaments are
allocated through this method (direct seats). The second vote determines the percentage of
the total seats (not the remaining ones) to be allocated to each diﬀerent party which reaches
at least 5% of the votes. We will refer to this second vote as the “List Vote”. As a consequence,
the data set contains data on four elections. In contrast to the French presidential election
experiments in 2002 (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008) and 2007 (Baujard and Igersheim,
2010), two of the elections include approval data for parties. Indeed, this data set is the ﬁrst
instance where approval data for parties has been collected in a realistic voting situation.
The ﬁrst experiment took place on January 27th 2008 during state elections in the German
state of Hesse. These elections were expected to be very close. Indeed, it was not possible to
form a government after the elections and new elections were called for. The experiment was
carried out in the town of Messel, a small community in South Hesse containing three separate
polling stations. From a total of 1909 personal voters who participated in the election, 967
(50.65%) took part in the study.
The second experiment was carried out on September 27th 2009 during the nationwide Ger-
man Federal elections in Konstanz, a city in the southern German state of Baden-Württemberg.
As in Konstanz itself and most of Germany, the conservative party (CDU) was expected to re-
ceive a simple majority both for the district election and the party-list election (for a more
detailed account, we refer the reader to Rohrschneider and Jung (2011) and the corresponding
special symposium on this election). The study used a sample of 6 polling stations. In these
stations, a total of 2879 personal voters took part in the oﬃcial election; of those, 1431 (49.7%)
participated in the study.
By comparing the oﬃcial results with the ones obtained in their experiments, Alós-Ferrer
and Granić (2010, 2012) found that election results might have changed, sometimes dramat-
ically, if Approval Voting rather than Plurality Voting had been used. Here, we will use the
data with a diﬀerent purpose: the computation of a political landscape snapshot using data
which is simply unavailable under Plurality Voting.
3 Spatial Approval Voting
Let us brieﬂy introduce the theoretical background of Spatial Approval Voting. A more detailed
account is given in A.3 We assume a political Euclidean space containing the locations of
the candidates/parties and the voters’ ideal points. The utility of a voter if an alternative
is chosen is determined by the negative of the distance between the voter’s ideal point and
the alternative’s location, plus a voter-independent valence term capturing the candidate’s or
party’s idiosyncratic traits (e.g. charisma), and a random term. The distance is scaled by a
parameter α, which captures the salience of policy or political programs. The larger α is, the
more relevant are political-space locations for voters’ utilities. This parameter is left unspeciﬁed
2This interpretation is closely related to the question format considered in item response theory developed
in Psychometrics (see Van Schuur, 2003). See, however, Laslier (2006, footnote 6).
3Including a minor correction made necessary by a misprinted formula in Laslier (2006).
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by the model.4
The probability that a voter approves of an alternative follows a random utility model,
i.e. is determined by the distribution of the random term and a given utility threshold (see
e.g. Anderson et al., 1992). The model also delivers estimates for the probability that a voter
simultaneously approves of two diﬀerent alternatives. On the other hand, experimental data
delivers the number of approvals for each individual alternative, and also the number of simul-
taneous approvals of any two speciﬁc alternatives. The latter is referred to as the number of
associations between two candidates. The resulting matrix of simultaneous approvals for all
pairs of alternatives is called the association matrix. Under speciﬁc assumptions on the distri-
bution of voters’ ideal points in the political space, Laslier (2006) develops approximations for
the number of approvals that a candidate receives and for the number of associations for any
given pair of alternatives. Those are functions of α and the distances among the alternatives’
positions in the political space. The formulae can be inverted to provide estimates of the dis-
tances as functions of the number of approvals and associations, which are actual outcomes in
an approval election. Since the relation depends on α, obtaining positive distances delivers a
constraint (a lower bound) on α.
In summary, experimental data from approval voting, and especially the numbers of associ-
ations, can be used to provide an estimate of political distances between candidates or parties,
as perceived by voters. The next step for obtaining a representation is, given those distances,
to use standard techniques from multidimensional scaling (see e.g. Seber, 1984) and principal
component analysis (see e.g. Jolliﬀe, 2002) in order to actually obtain a spatial representation.
From this representation, lower-dimensional projections can be considered which help with the
visualization of the political space as resulting from an aggregation of voters’ preferences. To
assess the quality of the lower-dimensional representations, one uses the concept of explained
inertia, which is deﬁned as follows. Let the inertia I of the set of alternatives be the sum of
the square distances among all possible pairs. Let IE the the inertia of the projections of the
alternatives in a lower-dimensional subspace E. The key component of the analysis is to check
how much inertia is explained by lower-dimensional projections. For example, Laslier (2006)
considers projections with roughly 70% explained inertia as a good ﬁt and we will follow this
practice.5
3.1 Data: Party Vote
We now turn to the spatial representations derived from the data. A discussion of the involved
diﬃculties and the accuracy of the representations for single parties is provided in B. An
important constraint of the spatial representation method is that the association matrix cannot
contain zero entries.6 This constraint is unlikely to be satisﬁed in ﬁeld experiments involving
a reasonable number of voters whenever many small parties are available. In the experiment,
it was satisﬁed for Candidate Vote in both Messel and Konstanz, but not for the Party Vote
(in neither case). To tackle this problem, we decided to exclude some of the smaller parties
and reduce the set of alternatives to a manageable level. Since the theory of spatial voting
determines the distance between two alternatives solely on the basis of approvals received
and the associations between those two alternatives, we can restrict our analysis to a subset of
4The valence dimension is a major difference between this model and the standard analysis of roll-call votes
through nominate scores (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1991). Candidates/parties located at the same
place in the political space can obtain different results due to the valence effect.
5The innovative part of spatial approval voting is the behavioral model of the decision making process
underlying approval voting. Once the model distances are calculated, standard estimation techniques (multi-
dimensional scaling) are used to find a representation; for more details on the exact procedure for obtaining a
spatial representation, see A.
6Else one obtains infinitely large distances. See Equation (3) in A.
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alternatives without loss of generality and still draw meaningful and consistent conclusions. The
parties we analyze in Messel are: SPD (social-democratic), CDU (conservative), the Greens,
FDP (market liberal), the Left (neo-communist), Animal Protection Party, the Family Party,
and the two extreme-right parties REP (Republicans) and NPD.
The association matrix for the party vote in Messel (reported in the Supplementary Online
Materials, SOM) is strictly positive, hence ﬁnding a spatial representation is, in principle,
possible. The smallest distance among the considered parties is the one between the two
extreme-right parties, NPD and REP. For that distance to be positive, we obtain the constraint
(see A) α ≥ 3.69. Hence, we set α = 3.69 resulting in a seven-dimensional representation
from which a reliable three-dimensional projection can be obtained for illustrative purposes
(explained inertia 65%).
Figure 1(a,b) shows the latter three-dimensional representation of the political space for the
parties in Messel. In all ﬁgures, we include a hypothetical “Left-Right Line” (more properly,
a piecewise linear curve) for better visual orientation. This line is constructed connecting the
locations of the parties which are traditionally perceived as having a clear left-right orientation.
It starts at the position of the Left (far-left party), continues to that of the Greens, connects
this point with the position of the SPD, and further continues to the location of the FDP, the
CDU, and the far-right NPD.
To a certain extent, the ﬁrst axis in Figure 1(a,b) reﬂects the standard one-dimensional
categorization of the parties into left and right (compare with the Left-Right Line). The
extreme-right parties REP and NPD are located far right, the German Social Democratic Party
(SPD), the Greens and the Left (neo-communist) party on the center left and the far left, the
conservative party CDU and the liberal party FDP in between. The center of the ﬁrst axis is
covered by the issue-oriented Animal Protection Party and the Family Party. This left-right
ordering of the parties does not stem from any distributional assumption, but is endogenously
determined by measuring the overlap of the diﬀerent electorates.
Examination of Figure 1(a,b), however, indicates that a reduction of the political space to
one dimension only would be misleading. The set of parties’ positions is far away from being
on a line. There are marked party diﬀerences along the second and third axes. As it is often
the case in multidimensional political space studies, the interpretation of these axes is not
unambiguous. For the second axis, the upper part contains the extreme right parties, as well as
the extreme left party, and is opposed to the liberal party FDP and conservative Party CDU.
The former in general support a stronger state with broader competencies for the government
and more intervention in the market system, while the latter prefer a liberal market system
without intervention by the state. A possible interpretation of the second axis is thus that it
reﬂects the diﬀerent standpoints market liberalism vs. state intervention.
It should also be remarked that even the three-dimensional projection might induce some
misinterpretation. For example, the position of the Family Party in the three-dimensional pro-
jection should not be trusted (see B). Examination of the full, seven-dimensional representation
reveals that this is the party closest to the NPD and REP. One of the major topics of the Fam-
ily Party is the strengthening of the family and the preservation of traditional family values.
Apparently, voters who approved of parties from the right end of the political spectrum also
cared for family policy issues, especially preserving traditional family values.
The representation also delivers other interesting insights. For instance, we observe a strong
clustering of the major parties. The distances between the SPD, the Green Party and the Left
are almost of the same magnitude, but much larger than the distances to any other party. The
party closest to the conservative CDU is the liberal FDP and vice versa. However, the distance
between the far-right NPD and the conservative CDU is only slightly larger than that between
the CDU and FDP. Of all the major parties, the CDU exhibits the smallest distance towards
the extreme right parties REP and NPD.
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This bimodal distribution of parties in the space reﬂecting the polarization of the electorate
after acrimoniously fought election campaigns between the SPD and CDU for the Hessian state
election in 2008. Mr. Koch, the party-leader of the Hessian CDU, stressed some popular right-
wing topics during his election campaign. He was pleading, for instance, for stronger penalties
for delinquent adolescence that have a strong migration background.7 The distance between
the CDU and SPD, the parties who were in the federal government in Germany the day of the
experiment (the so-called “grand coalition”, Scarrow, 2011), is very large. In fact, the far-left
party the Left and the market-liberal party FDP are closer together than the parties of the
big coalition, in terms of overlapping electorate. Indeed, the CDU’s election posters directly
targeted the leaders of the SPD, the Greens and the Left while the SPD’s and the Green’s
leftward movement saw them campaigning for a minimum wage (for an election report see
Broughton, 2008).
Let us turn to the data from Konstanz (Federal elections). The threshold value for α
such that all model distances are positive is equal to 3.72. We set α accordingly, allowing
for a reliable nine-dimensional representation (see B). However, with three dimensions we only
explain about 57% of the inertia. Appropriately representing some of the parties requires more
than ﬁve dimensions. Nevertheless, the technique employed to obtain a spatial representation
is such that taking into account an additional dimension does not aﬀect the coordinates of
the parties on the previously analyzed dimensions. When interpreting the political space, the
conclusions based on the relative positions along a given dimension, as those given below,
remain valid although a party might not be well represented. However, the distances between
certain parties might not be accurately represented. Therefore, we will refer to the full set of
dimensions (nine in the case of Konstanz) when interpreting distances between parties.
Again we reduce the set of parties to obtain a restricted but strictly positive association
matrix (reported in the SOM). The parties we analyze in Konstanz are: SPD, CDU, the Greens,
FDP, the Left, Animal Protection Party, ödp (Ecological Democratic Party, environmentalist),
the Violet Party (which pursues a social order based on “self-awareness through individual
spirituality”), the Pirate Party (issue-oriented, supports the preservation of current civil rights
on the Internet), REP, and NPD.
Figure 1(c,d) shows the three-dimensional representation of the political space for parties in
Konstanz (including a Left-Right Line generated as explained above). In contrast to the case
of Messel, the interpretation of the ﬁrst axis is not so clear. The ideologically-related parties
NPD and REP exhibit again the smallest distance, being located farthest right on the ﬁrst
axis. Next to them, we ﬁnd the Left and the Violet Party. It is hard to argue that participants
approving both of extreme-left and extreme-right parties are ideologically motivated. One
possible explanation for the closeness between the German extreme right-wingers and extreme
leftist is preferences towards extreme parties or, to put it plainly, protest voters. The center
is occupied by the Pirate Party and the ödp. The large parties are located at the left. Hence,
it seems that the ﬁrst axis distinguishes the large traditional parties from smaller and extreme
parties.8 We still observe clustering as in the case of Messel. The CDU has the smallest distance
with the FDP and vice versa, the SPD is closest to the Greens, reﬂecting traditional coalitions
in Germany. The parties with the smallest distance to the Greens are the Animal Protection
Party and the ödp, quite naturally as all three parties emphasize environmental issues, but they
are closely followed by the SPD. All three distances are of comparable magnitude. As a last
7This strategy is not new. The election polls in 2003 forecast a dramatic decrease in terms of share for
Mr. Koch and his party. He then started a fiercely debated and polarizing election campaign. Mr. Koch was
criticized for exploiting the mechanism of election campaign and fueling hatred against foreigners. At the end,
his party received an absolute majority of seats.
8We have to point out that the City of Konstanz was ruled by a Green major at the time of the experiment
and that the Green Party there is much stronger than in the rest of Germany, so the Green Party fits into the
picture of a more traditional party.
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comment, our analysis shows that the right-wing parties NPD and REP are much more diﬀerent
than a usual one-dimensional, left-right, representation would suggest. The Republicans are
more accepted (and therefore much closer in the representation) amongst the conservative voters
who approved of CDU and FDP than the NPD. On the other hand, the NPD is closer to parties
which care about environmental issues, such as the Greens and the ödp, than to the REP. In
summary, the representation seems to deliver interesting insights which were not immediately
obvious before the experiment, but which are far from arbitrary. In our view, observations as
these validate the possible value of spatial representation techniques based on approval voting
data to provide an accurate snapshot of voter preferences.
3.2 Data: Candidate Vote
The snapshot we obtain from the candidate vote can potentially diﬀer from the one of the
party vote. First, the candidate election in the mixed-member proportional representation
concerns the district level and is qualitatively diﬀerent from the party election, which concerns
the federal level. That is, the available candidates aspired to represent the local district level,
while party votes where aggregated at the federal level. Second, during the analysis of the
data, we encountered frequent cases of voters who approved of a particular candidate, but did
not approve of the corresponding party, and vice versa. Voters may perceive a candidate as a
worthwhile recipient of their approval, without agreeing with the general party position.9
The association matrix for the candidates in Messel (see the SOM) is strictly positive, hence
we can represent the full set of candidates. A value of α = 3.84 allows for a six-dimensional
representation and a three-dimensional projection thereof with an explained inertia of 73%
(see B). The latter is shown in Figure 2(a,b), where again we include a Left-Right Line as a
visual aid. The ﬁrst axis distinguishes Left-wing and Right-wing candidates. The center of
this axis is empty. Comparing the party and candidate representations, the candidate vote
seems to be more polarized than the party vote. The far ends of the representation move closer
together. Nevertheless, we observe the same pattern of clustering of the major candidates that
we observed for parties. The SPD, the Left, and the Greens candidates form one cluster, the
candidates of the CDU and the FDP another one. The SPD exhibits the smallest distance to the
Greens and vice versa. The same is true for the candidates of CDU and FDP. Again, reducing
the space to one dimension is misleading. The distance between the center-right candidate
of the CDU and the center-left candidate of the SPD is larger than the distance between the
far-left and far-right candidates of the Left and the NPD.
Again, the association matrix for the candidates in Konstanz (see the SOM) is strictly
positive and enables us to represent the full set of candidates. A value of α = 2.55 allows for a
four-dimensional representation of the model distances (see B). All parties are well represented
in the lower-dimensional projection. In fact, with three dimensions we explain about 98% of
the inertia. It is an striking result that the three-dimensional projection yields such an accurate
picture of the overall distances. However, a reduction to only one dimension would explain only
54% of the inertia.
At ﬁrst glance, the number of available candidates is much smaller than in the applications
before. Yet, there is no obvious reason to assume that a smaller set of alternatives increases the
precision of the lower-dimensional projections. The crucial point is that four dimensions are
enough to ﬁnd a good representation of the overall picture. Obviously, the more dimensions are
required for an accurate representation, the poorer will be the lower-dimensional projections.
Presumably, the particularities of the voting district Konstanz play an important role here.
The three-dimensional representation for the candidate vote in Konstanz is shown in Figure
9Of course, one can expect a high correlation between the evaluation of a party and that of its leader. See
Wagner and Weßels (2011).
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2(c,d) (the far-right position in the Left-Right Line corresponds to the NPD candidate only,
because there was no REP candidate in Konstanz). Similarly to our observations from the
party vote representation, the ﬁrst axis does not distinguish the left-wing from the right-wing
candidates. The distance between the Left candidate and the right-wing candidate of the NPD
is actually the smallest. Although the party vote and the candidate vote constitute two distinct
idiosyncratic elections, we can transfer our ﬁndings for the representation from the former to
latter. The overlap in the electorate for the two traditional coalitions can also be observed here
with the further addition that the Left needs to be placed into the same cluster as the SPD
and Greens as those parties exhibit a more or less equal distance to each other.
Again, examination of the representation reveals interesting insights on the local political
landscape at the time of the election. For example, we already emphasized in the analysis
for the Party Vote that the overlap of the electorate between the NPD and parties orientated
towards environmental issues is similar to the overlap between the REP and conservative voters.
This observation is even stronger for the Candidate Vote in the sense that the NPD candidate
is located closer to the Green candidate than he is to the CDU candidate.
4 A Method Comparison Using VAA Data
The spatial representations in the last section revealed multi-dimensional political landscapes
both for the state elections in 2008 in Hesse and the federal elections in 2009 in Germany. As
with any other scaling method the theory of Spatial Approval Voting does not provide explicit
meanings for the uncovered dimensions. The data input for this theory is a series of answers
to yes/no questions measuring the electorate overlap for diﬀerent parties without any reference
to policies or positional issues.
The “theory-free” explorative approach implicit in all scaling methods constitutes both a
merit and a demerit for the theory of Spatial Approval Voting.10 On the one hand, the dimen-
sions are endogenously determined by the data, which means we do not need to worry about
the omission of potentially relevant policy issues in a priori determined sets of survey ques-
tions, the aggregation of scores attached to positional issues across a particular set of experts,
or even the possibly arguable category deﬁnitions for ’word scores’ and manifesto analysis. On
the other hand, each dimension may represent a mix of several underlying issues, conﬂicts and
party cleavages which may not be fully revealed or identiﬁed. Furthermore, the obtained repre-
sentations take into account the perspective of the voters only. It is thus important to contrast
the results with a well-developed theory of party competition in Germany from the viewpoint
of the “supply side”, i.e. data arising from declared party positions.
To provide an answer to these questions and validate our analysis, we re-estimate the policy
space using party signals as data inputs. Our aim is to compare the results with those obtained
from our ﬁeld experiments data, thereby comparing a content-based representation obtained
from explicit party positions with our representation based on voter perceptions.11 Before that,
however, we conduct a preliminary step. Since the theory of Spatial Approval Voting is a
relatively new method and Approval Voting data sets within “real” political contexts are rare,
we also cross-validate the new estimations by comparing them to W-NOMINATE (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1985, 1991) ones. This scaling procedure is the natural method for cross-validation
because responses under Approval Voting are similar to roll calls.
10The expression “theory-free” refers here to the underlying political space to be estimated and not to the
estimation methods themselves, which of course come from well developed theories.
11We focus here on the Party Vote elections. The Candidate Vote receives far less attention and a lower media
coverage due its local nature. Further, parliament members elected through the Candidate Vote can decide not
to follow the general party line (see e.g. Sieberer, 2010). An analysis of the difference between constituency
candidates and party lines is beyond the scope of the present article.
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The new representations based on party data can be directly compared with our Party Vote
representations, and show that the latter stand on a solid base. We then revisit the existing
literature on party competition in Germany embedding our ﬁndings into existing theories. This
allows us identify the main dimensions of political contestation from the point of view of the
competing parties.
4.1 Wahl-O-Mat Estimation
The data set we use to model the supply side, i.e. party positions as viewed by the parties
themselves, are responses provided by the parties to the online voting advice application “Wahl-
O-Mat” organized by the Federal Agency for Civic Education. Unfortunately, there is no Wahl-
O-Mat data available for the Hessian election in 2008, hence we present here only the results
for the federal election in 2009.12 The Wahl-O-Mat is a non-party service that confronts the
end user with a series of propositions such as “There should be a quota for women in leading
positions” and “Germany should leave the European Union”. The user expresses his opinion on
each of the propositions (“I agree”, “Neutral” or “I disagree”). Extra options allow users to skip
a proposition or attach extra weight to propositions they consider important. Before the launch
of the Wahl-O-Mat site for a particular election, the running parties position themselves on all
propositions. At the end of the process the Wahl-O-Mat displays the agreement scores between
users and parties. We use the party signals, i.e. the responses of the parties provided to the
online application, as inputs for the spatial representation. Since the site is publicly accessible,
the responses can be regarded as the parties’ sincere statements regarding each of the various
propositions. Our translation of the 38 Wahl-O-Mat questions can be found in Appendix C.
The detailed party responses can be found in the SOM.
The innovation in our approach is using this data as input for Spatial Approval Voting.
The latter uses simultaneous approvals of parties by voters to determine the overlaps in the
perception of parties by voters. Applying Spatial Approval to the voting advice application
data, we propose to use the simultaneous approval of propositions by parties (“I agree” state-
ments) to determine the overlaps in the programmatic positions of parties. To understand why
this is feasible, one can think of the following reinterpretation of the data. Conceive of each
proposition as a hypothetical voter who cares most about the issue captured by the proposition
and then decides which parties to approve of, i.e. approves of all the parties which agree with
the proposition. This allows us to build an association matrix which is directly comparable to
the one we obtain from our Approval Voting ﬁeld experiments.13
For validation purposes, we used the same data to conduct a parallel estimation using W-
NOMINATE. One can simply imagine that the parties form a deliberative body and vote over
whether or not to adopt each proposition. The party responses then form a roll call matrix
which can be used to implement the W-NOMINATE algorithm (Poole et al., 2011).
The spatial representations obtained from Wahl-O-Mat data through Spatial Approval Vot-
ing and W-NOMINATE are shown in Figure 3. Goodness-of-ﬁt measures for the explanatory
power of the diﬀerent dimensions are reported in the SOM. The representations obtained from
Spatial Approval Voting and W-NOMINATE agree to high degree on the relative positions of
the parties on the ﬁrst two dimensions. The correlation coeﬃcients (Pearson) for party posi-
tions between the two models are 0.94 and 0.96 for the ﬁrst and second dimensions, respectively.
Moreover, the political competition, independently of the scaling method used, is essentially
12The party inputs for the‘Wahl-O-Mat were used in Tangian (2013) to analyze the federal election in Germany
in 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy. For a detailed description of the Wahl-O-Mat see Marschall and
Schmidt (2010). A more general discussion on voting advice applications is provided in the special symposium
on the very same topic forthcoming in Electoral Studies, see Rosema et al. (forthcoming) and references therein.
13A different way to compute the association matrix is to count how often pairs of parties agree in their
statements on the propositions. The corresponding analysis yields qualitatively similar results.
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two-dimensional. The ﬁrst two dimensions explain 77% of the variance under Spatial Approval
Voting. Similarly, under the W-NOMINATE procedure, with two dimensions we obtain 91.85%
correct classiﬁcations with an Aggregate Proportional Reduction Error (APRE) of 0.72.14
This analysis illustrates that Spatial Approval Voting estimates are similar to W-NOMINATE
ones when both can be applied to the same data set. However, we remark that it is in general
not possible to apply W-NOMINATE to data sets where Spatial Approval Voting will generate
representations. For instance, the W-NOMINATE algorithm cannot be directly applied to our
Approval Voting ﬁeld data. The reason is that Approval Voting data sets are highly skewed with
roughly 85% responses corresponding to non-approvals. The relatively small number of parties
(or roll-calls if interpreted in terms of W-NOMINATE) in comparison to voters as well as the
fact that many parties receive approval rates smaller than 1.0% makes estimation infeasible.
4.2 Comparison and Theoretical Background
The ﬁnding that party positions in Germany, as obtained from Wahl-O-Mat data, can be
viewed as essentially two-dimensional is in line with the existing literature on political space
representations in Germany. Indeed, the German policy space has been associated with two
dimensions in previous studies. Unfortunately the literature disagrees on the nature of these
dimensions and how the German parties should be located on these dimensions (Benoit et al.,
2009). For example, analyzing data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, Linhart and
Shikano (2009) reject the notion of a left/right-wing super-issue in favor of a two-dimensional
policy space for Germany (Economic and Social Policy dimensions). Analyzing contents of
editorial sections of newspapers, Kriesi et al. (2006) identiﬁed an economic and a cultural
dimension in contemporary Western Europe democracies including Germany. Moreover, these
studies show ample evidence that parties change their issue positions over time.
In spite of the heterogeneous ﬁndings for the exact positioning of the parties, in view of the
literature we can easily identify the important cleavages depicted in our Wahl-O-Mat data rep-
resentations in Figure 3(a) and (b). The ﬁrst dimension is the Socio-Economic dimension that
separates the left, the greens and the socialist from the liberals, conservatives and Christian
democrats. Not surprisingly, the extreme-right party NPD is associated with a more socialist
type of Socio-Economic policy. For instance, the NPD supports nation-wide minimal wages,
permanent equity holdings by the government in private banks, and governmental control over
top-manager salaries. The second dimension is compatible with the ﬁndings in Kriesi et al.
(2006) and broadly corresponds to the cultural dimension. Parties like the FDP and the Pi-
rates ﬁght for freedom in the net and against government regulations, support gender equality
and equal rights for same-sex couples, the strengthening of civil liberties and direct democratic
rights, and argue for structural reforms to increase eﬃciency and transparency of the govern-
ment and public administration. On the other extreme of the cultural dimension, the NPD is
the epitome of cultural demarcation. The party disapproves of the current German democratic
order and constitution, and aspires to establish a tougher, authoritarian state. The party is
homophobic, anti-EU and anti-NATO, and contends that Germany should be “cleansed” from
foreign, capitalistic inﬂuences.
Figure 3(c) again presents the Party Vote representation from the 2009 federal election in
Konstanz and is obtained by interchanging dimensions 1 and 2 and inverting dimension 1 from
the original representation shown in Figure 1(c). A comparison of Figures 3(a) and 3(c) shows
that circular structure in the ﬁrst two dimensions is present both in party statements and from
the point of view of the voters. The correlation analysis between the Wahl-O-Mat data and
14The two-dimensional interpretation of the W-NOMINATE results is also supported by the corresponding
scree plot, the normalized eigenvalues fall off fairly smoothly after the 3rd value (see e.g. Poole, 2005, page
144–164, for a discussion of scree plots).
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the approval voting data conﬁrms the existence of the Socio-Economic Dimension. Speciﬁcally,
the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.90 for this dimension, which is a high value especially if taking
into account that the representations are based on fundamentally diﬀerent data. Further, the
labeling of the dimensions enabled by the comparative analysis yields a likely interpretation for
the circular structure. This might be a manifestation of the ﬁnancial crises and the struggle to
overcome economic recession by the then-ruling grand coalition. Discontent voters were lead to
endorse anti-incumbent alternatives from ‘both ends’ of the political spectrum (for an election
report see Helms, 2010).
There are, however, major diﬀerences between the representations in Figures 3(a) and 3(c).
First, we cannot identify the Cultural dimension. This has nothing to do with our choice of
the two dimensions. Whichever combination of dimensions we consider from the Party Vote
estimations, compared to the Wahl-O-Mat estimates the Pirate Party is bound to the center
and the FDP is tied to the position of the CDU. This suggest that voters are more likely to
be driven by political traditions than by actual political proﬁles of the parties and are more
likely to overvalue ‘wedge’ issues stressed by smaller parties. While the Pirate Party oﬀers
opinions on many issues it is mainly perceived as defending the privacy and freedom of the
net. This programmatic issue is actually supported by many voters throughout all political
camps. The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, for the Animal Protection Party and the
ödp. Similarly, the FDP tied its fate the CDU by explicitly campaigning for a coalition with
CDU and asking CDU voters to support the FDP with their Party Vote. Second, the Socio-
Economic Dimension is no longer the most important dimension in terms of explanatory power.
Crucially, the representations from the point of view of the voters suggest the existence of more
than two dimensions for the political landscape in Germany.
Germany (Kriesi et al., 2006; Linhart and Shikano, 2009, e.g.) and in general Western
European countries (e.g. Warwick, 2002) have been often associated with multi-dimensional
contestation. The theme of multi-dimensionality has been established under many diﬀerent
estimation techniques including the NOMINATE algorithm. For example, Hix et al. (2006)
identify an important second, albeit less salient dimension of politics in the European Parlia-
ment. In line with these ﬁndings our results suggest, from the point of view of the competing
parties, a two-dimensional political contestation in Germany. Nonetheless, we identify impor-
tant diﬀerences between supply side and demand side representations; in particular, the latter
appears to require a larger number of dimensions. Notably, these diﬀerences arise using the
same estimation technique and simply changing the input source. We conclude that voters
are more likely to be driven by political traditions than by the actual political proﬁles of the
parties.
The diﬀerences between representations based on party statements and those based on voter
perceptions resonate with previous work in the literature. For instance, a discrepancy between
representations obtained through diﬀerent input sources has also been observed in van der Brug
and van Spanje (2009). The interpretation of our results is also aligned with the ﬁndings in
Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld (2009). Relying on an expert survey for 13 post-Communist
democracies, these authors argue that the characteristics of political landscapes might often be
blurred if the distinction between issue position and issue salience is not taken into account.
In our opinion, issue salience will typically play a stronger role whenever actual voter data
is considered, while party-originated data as that from voting advice applications (with an
exogenous set of propositions) might oﬀer a picture more centered on pure issue positions. This
view ﬁts well with our observations. The explanatory power of the Socio-Economic dimensions
for our representations based on party signals is by far the largest one. However, voters attach a
much lower salience to this issue, and other dimensions become equally or even more important.
Further, voters seem to view wedge issues as more salient, and also attach a higher salience to
non-programmatic aspects as e.g. traditional coalitions.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the spatial representation of political landscapes using a
unique data set which contains approval data for two party elections and two candidate elections
in Germany. Our study is the ﬁrst to estimate a political landscape for parties on the basis
of such data. We use the data to obtain spatial representations of parties and candidates in
an endogenously determined political space. This is made possible by techniques developed in
Laslier (2006). This model delivers an interesting method for obtaining spatial representations
of political positions, which uses data not available under e.g. Plurality Voting. The researcher
observes the approval data in an experiment, uses these data to estimate the distances among
parties, and ﬁnally obtains a low-dimensional spatial representation. The objective is to obtain
an accurate representation with as low a dimensionality as possible. The dimensions, however,
are endogenous and need not correspond to exogenously decided variables.
We compute spatial representations for all four elections, which in some cases are already re-
liable with a relatively low number of dimensions; one dimension, however, never suﬃces. This
provides us with political snapshots of the electorate’s preferences at the moment of the corre-
sponding election. The representations also serve as eﬃcient ways of organizing the data and
illustrate how insights on the local political situation can be obtained. For instance, we observe
a clustering of the traditional German coalitions among the large parties. The conservative
CDU has the smallest distance with the liberal FDP and vice versa, and the social-democratic
SPD is at a comparable distance to the Greens, reﬂecting traditional coalitions in Germany.
The parties with the smallest distance toward the Greens also emphasize environmental issues.
The radical right-wing NPD and Republican Party are not so close as one might expect, how-
ever. The Republicans are more accepted (and therefore much closer in the representation)
amongst the conservative voters who approved of CDU and FDP than the NPD. On the other
hand, the NPD is closer to environmental-issue parties than to the Republicans. In summary,
the representations obtained from our data are politically sensible but also seem to deliver
interesting insights which were not immediately obvious before the analysis of the data.
Our analysis has general consequences beyond the speciﬁc data set considered. Even though
the method aims to obtain a representation with as few dimensions as possible, we still obtain
representations with four dimensions or more. This is in sharp contrast to e.g. Wiesehomeier
and Benoit (2009), who argue that their data can be structured along a single main left-right
dimension. Our results, however, do not contradict that study at all. The two studies are at
opposite extremes in several respects. First, Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) use expert data,
while we rely on voting decisions cast by voters. Second, they start with exogenously given
issues or dimensions which experts are asked about, while the dimensions in our approach are
endogenously determined by the data. Third, they use data from central and south America,
while ours originates in elections in Germany. It is fair to say that, taking both studies together,
in some occasions and for some purposes assuming a single policy dimension might be a useful
way to structure the data; but this remains an assumption which might be unwarranted in
other situations and for other purposes.
The origin of the data is of particular importance. We also apply the representation method
to party-generated data from the voting advice application “Wahl-O-Mat” and show that the
results agree with those obtained when applying the W-NOMINATE algorithm to the same
data. This serves two purposes. First, it oﬀers a cross-validation of the method. Second, it
allows us to contrast representations based on the demand side (voter perceptions) and on the
supply side (party statements). Interestingly, the representations are generally in agreement
but voter-based ones require a larger number of dimensions, reﬂecting the fact that, at least
in the German case, voters’ perceptions of parties include dimensions beyond those reﬂecting
actual political proﬁles, as e.g. traditional coalitions or salient wedge issues.
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Finally, we want to emphasize that the analysis presented here illustrates how the use of
approval data can present a deﬁnite advantage over election or poll data where voters only
report their voting intention, i.e. a single party or candidate. It would be relatively easy to
adapt polls to use an approach based on Approval Voting. If such a technology were adopted
even in a fraction of studies, it could, in our opinion, represent a major advance for the spatial
representation of political landscapes.
Acknowledgments
We thank Michael Bechtel, Steven Brams, and Jean-François Laslier for useful comments and
suggestions. Granić gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the German Research Foun-
dation (DFG) through research project AL-1169/2-1 and through the research unit “Psychoe-
conomics” (FOR 1882).
References
Alós-Ferrer, C., 2006. A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting. Social Choice and Welfare
27, 621–625.
Alós-Ferrer, C., Granić, Ð.G., 2010. Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field
Experiment, in: Laslier, J.F., Sanver, M.R. (Eds.), Handbook on Approval Voting. Springer.
Alós-Ferrer, C., Granić, Ð.G., 2012. Two Field Experiments on Approval Voting in Germany.
Social Choice and Welfare 39, 171–205.
Anderson, S.P., de Palma, A., Thisse, J.F., 1992. Discrete Choice Theory of Product Diﬀeren-
tiation. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Baujard, A., Igersheim, H., 2010. Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons
from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections, in: Laslier, J.F., Sanver, M.R. (Eds.),
Handbook on Approval Voting. Springer.
Benoit, K., Bräuninger, T., Debus, M., 2009. Challenges for estimating policy preferences:
Announcing an open access archive of political documents. German Politics 18, 441–454.
Benoit, K., Laver, M., 2007. Estimating Party Policy Positions: Comparing Expert Surveys
and Hand-Coded Content Analysis. Electoral Studies 26, 90–107.
Bernhardt, D., Duggan, J., Squintani, F., 2009. The Case for Responsible Parties. American
Political Science Review 103, 570–587.
Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C., 1978. Approval Voting. The American Political Science Review
72, 831–847.
Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C., 2005. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of
Approval Voting. Social Choice and Welfare 25, 457–474.
Broughton, D., 2008. Frozen in the Centre, Melting at the Edges? The Landtagswahlen in
Hesse and Lower Saxony, January 2008. German Politics 17, 203–211.
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E., 2001. Mapping Policy
Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1988. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
15
Davis, O.A., Hinich, M.J., Ordeshook, P.C., 1970. An Expository Development of a Mathe-
matical Model of the Electoral Process. The American Political Science Review 64, 426–448.
Enelow, J.M., Hinich, M.J. (Eds.), 1990. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Camebridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fishburn, P.C., 1978a. Axioms for Approval Voting: Direct Proof. Journal of Economic Theory
19, 180–185.
Fishburn, P.C., 1978b. Symmetric and Consistent Aggregation with Dichotomous Voting, in:
Laﬀont, J.J. (Ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. North-Holland.
Harrington, J.E.J., Hess, G.D., 1996. A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning.
Games and Economic Behavior 17, 209–229.
Helms, L., 2010. The German federal election, September 2009. Electoral Studies 29, 276–296.
Hix, S., Noury, A., Roland, G., 2006. Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament.
American Journal of Political Science 50, 494–511.
Jenkins, J.A., 1999. Examining the bonding eﬀects of party: A comparative analysis of roll-
call voting in the US and Confederate houses. American Journal of Political Science 43,
1144–1165.
Jolliﬀe, I.T., 2002. Principal Component Analysis. NY: Springer Verlag. 2nd edition.
Kitschelt, H., McGann, A., 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative
Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., Frey, T., 2008. West European
Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezaland, M., Bornschier, S., Frey, T., 2006. Globalization
and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared.
European Journal of Political Research 45, 921–956.
Laslier, J.F., 1996. Multivariate description of comparison matrices. Journal of Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis 5, 112–126.
Laslier, J.F., 2006. Spatial Approval Voting. Political Analysis 14, 160–185.
Laslier, J.F., Sanver, M.R. (Eds.), 2010. Handbook on Approval Voting. Berlin Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag.
Laslier, J.F., Van der Straeten, K., 2008. A Live Experiment on Approval Voting. Experimental
Economics 11, 97–105.
Linhart, E., Shikano, S., 2009. Ideological Signals of German Parties in a Multi-Dimensional
Space: An Estimation of Party Preferences Using the CMP Data. German Politics 18,
301–322.
Londregan, J.B., 1999. Estimating Legislators’ Preferred Points. Political Analysis 8, 35–56.
Marschall, S., Schmidt, C.K., 2010. The Impact of Voting Indicators: The Case of the German
Wahl-O-Mat, in: Cederoni, L., Garcia, D. (Eds.), Voting Advice Applications in Europe. The
State of the Art. E-Book.
16
McKelvey, R.D., 1976. Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implica-
tions for Agenda Control. Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482.
Oppenhuis, E., 1995. Voting Behavior in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Partic-
ipation and Party Choice. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Poole, K.T., 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Poole, K.T., Lewis, J., Lo, J., Carroll, R., 2011. Scaling Roll Call Votes with W-NOMINATE
in R. Journal of Statistical Software 42, 1–21.
Poole, K.T., Rosenthal, H., 1985. A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. American
Journal of Political Science 29, 357–384.
Poole, K.T., Rosenthal, H., 1991. Patterns of congressional voting. American Journal of
Political Science 35, 228–278.
Rohrschneider, R., Jung, F., 2011. SS: Germany’s Federal Election in September 2009 - Elec-
tions in Times of Duress - Introduction. Electoral Studies 31, 1–4.
Rohrschneider, R., Whiteﬁeld, S., 2009. Understanding Cleavages in Party Systems: Issue Po-
sition and Issue Salience in 13 Post-Communist Democracies. Comparative Political Studies
42, 280–313.
Rosema, M., Anderson, J., Walgrave, S., forthcoming. The design, purpose, and eﬀects of
voting advice applications. Electoral Studies .
Saari, D.G., 1994. The Geometry of Voting. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Sartori, G., 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Scarrow, S.E., 2011. The German Grand Coalition of 2005-09 and Party System Change:
Catalyst or Continuity? Electoral Studies 31, 60–71.
Seber, G.A., 1984. Multivariate Observations. New York: Wiley.
Sieberer, U., 2010. Behavioral Consequences of Mixed Electoral Systems: Deviating Voting
Behavior of District and List MPs in the German Bundestag. Electoral Studies 29, 484–496.
Tangian, A., 2013. German parliamentary Elections 2009 from the Viewpoint of Direct Democ-
racy. Social Choice and Welfare 40, 833–869.
van der Brug, W., van Spanje, J., 2009. Immigration, Europe and the New Cultural Dimension.
European Journal of Political Research 48, 309–334.
Van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M.N., Van der Brug, W., 1999. Policy Preferences and Party
Choice, in: Schmitt, H., Thomassen, J. (Eds.), Political Representation and Legitimacy in
the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Schuur, W.H., 2003. Mokken Scale Analysis: A Nonparametric Version of Guttman Scaling
for Survey Research. Political Analysis 11, 139–163.
Wagner, A., Weßels, B., 2011. Parties and Their Leaders. Does It Matter How They Match?
The German General Elections 2009 in Comparison. Electoral Studies 31, 72–82.
17
Warwick, P.V., 2002. Toward a Common Dimensionality in West European Policy Spaces.
Party Politics 8, 101–122.
Wiesehomeier, N., Benoit, K., 2009. Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition. The Journal
of Politics 71, 1435–1447.
18
A Spatial Approval Voting: Theory
In order to economize notation, and following Laslier (2006), we refer to the possible alternatives
as “candidates”. However, all statements apply for the case of parties.
The political space is a k -dimensional Euclidean space. There exists a set of voters V of
cardinality N > 0 and a nonempty set of candidates C. Each candidate c ∈ C is characterized
by her location yc ∈ Rk, each voter v ∈ V by her ideal point xv ∈ Rk. The distribution of the
voters’ ideal points has a density f .
The utility function of voter v (over candidates) is given by:
uv(c) = −α||yc − xv||2 + Γc + ǫv,c, (1)
where
• ||yc−xv|| is the usual Euclidean distance between the candidate’s location and the voter’s
ideal point and α is a policy salience parameter capturing the importance of political
proximity for the voter’s utility;
• Γc = log(γc) and γc is a valence parameter, independent of the candidate c’s location
and voter v’s identity, which captures the candidate’s personal traits such as honesty,
charisma, or competence; and
• ǫv,c is a disturbance term which is i.i.d. exponentially distributed with rate parameter 1
(i.e. the cumulative distribution function is given by: F (ǫ) = 1− exp(ǫ)).
Voting is probabilistic. A voter will approve of a candidate if (1) exceeds a certain ﬁxed
threshold, which can be normalized to zero without loss of generality. It follows that the
probability that voter v will approve of candidate c (in the following denoted as the event
Avc = 1) is given by
Pr[Avc = 1] = Pr[ǫv,c ≥ α||yc − xv||2 − Γc].
Estimating Political Distances
Given the distributional assumptions on ǫv,c from above, the approval probability can be written
as
Pr[Avc = 1] = F (α||yc − xv||2 − Γc) = γc exp(−α||yc − xv||2). (2)
A larger γc implies a higher probability of approval, that is the higher the evaluation of the
personal traits of a candidate, ceteris paribus, the larger is the probability that this candidate
will be approved of. A large α implies a faster decrease in the probability when the distance
between the candidate and the voter increases, that is, consideration about political locations
play a stronger role in the decision whom to approve of when α is larger.
The random variables Av,c are independent, and hence the probability of voter v approving
of several candidates simultaneously is given by the product of the marginals.
The number of voters who approve of candidate c follows from equation (2):
a(c) = N
∫
γc exp(−α||yc − x||2)f(x)dx.
Similarly, the number of voters who approve of candidates c and c′ simultaneously is
a(c, c′) = N
∫
γcγc′ exp(−α||yc − x||2 − α||yc′ − x||2)f(x)dx.
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The number of approvals received by a candidate, a(c), and the number of simultaneous
approvals of two candidates, a(c, c′), are observable. Henceforth, a(c, c′) is referred to as the
number of associations between two candidates. The remaining parameters of the model are
α, γc, the locations of the candidates yc and the density function f .
Under the hypothesis of a very ﬂat distribution, it can be shown that experimental data
provides us with enough information to determine the relative positions of candidates in the
political space. To be more precise, let f be the density of a normal distribution with concen-
tration λ, centered around zero:
f(x) =
(
λ
π
)k/2
exp(−λ||x||2).
If λ tends to zero, we approach a uniform distribution of the ideal points in space. If λ is small
enough compared to α, the formulae for the number of voters who approve of candidate c and
the number of associations between two candidates, can be approximated as follows.
a(c) ≃ Nγc
(
λ
π
)k/2
,
a(c, c′) ≃ Nγcγc′
(
λ
π
)k/2
exp(−α
2
||yc − yc′||2).
As it can be seen from these expressions, the number of voters must be large enough,
“precisely of the order of magnitude N ≃ N0λ−k/2 ” (Laslier, 2006),15 for the number of
approvals not to degenerate, where N0 is the actual number of participating voters. Standard
manipulation shows that the distance between two candidates in the approximated model is
given by
||yc − yc′||2 ≃ A′ − B′ lnN0 a(c, c
′)
a(c)a(c′)
, (3)
where A′ =
k
α
ln
α
2
and B′ =
2
α
. Hence, the distance between two candidates no longer depends
on their valence parameters. The quotient a(c)a(c′)/a(c, c′) can be interpreted as a measure of
correlation between the candidates. The more strongly the electorate of two candidates overlap,
the smaller will be the distance between them.
Obtaining the Spatial Representation
The key for obtaining a spatial representation of the alternatives is Multidimensional Scaling
and Principal Component Analysis. Let yc be k points in R
k centered at zero. A priori, one
can assume k to be equal to the number of available alternatives, since k points in a Euclidean
space of a higher dimension can always be embedded in Rk. The inertia of y = (y)c∈C is deﬁned
as the sum of the squared distances,
I(y) =
∑
c,c′∈C
||yc − yc′||2.
Let yE denote the projection of the system of points y on a linear subspace E of Rk. I(yE) is
the inertia explained by E and the ratio I(yE)/I(y) measures the quality of the representation
of y by yE. The goal is now to ﬁnd a reliable (in terms of explained inertia) lower-dimensional
representation of y.
15Unfortunately, this formula was misprinted in Laslier (2006). This is the corrected version.
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Let D be the (k×k) symmetric distance matrix, i.e. D12 is the distance between alternative
1 and 2 calculated according to (3). The representation is based on a matrix Γ derived from
D, called matrix of inertia, which is deﬁned as
Γ = (D · J + J ·D − J ·D · J −D)/2 (4)
where J is a (k × k) matrix with all entries equal to 1. Let µ1, ..., µk be the eigenvalues of Γ,
ordered from largest to smallest, and let ν1, ..., νk be the corresponding normed eigenvectors.
The best projection of the initial point system into a linear, i-dimensional subspace Ei of R
k
contains the center,
∑
c yc, and is spanned by the ﬁrst i eigenvectors. Under the speciﬁcations
above, the percentage of explained inertia in the i-dimensional representation is given by
ρ(i) =
I(yEi)
I(y)
=
∑i
j=1 µj∑k
j=1 µj
.
The quality of representation for each single point can be measured by the cosine of the pro-
jection, which is given by
r(c, i) =
||yEi||
||y|| . (5)
That is, the closer is r(c, i) to 1, the better is candidate c represented.
As mentioned above, the model leaves unspeciﬁed the policy salience parameter α. Esti-
mated distance have to be non-negative anf this puts a lower bound on α. We obtain the lower
bound on α from Equation 3. For all pairwise comparisons of alternatives, it must be that16
N0
a(c, c′)
a(c)a(c′)
≤
(α
2
)k/2
.
16Due to the misprint mentioned previously, the version of this formula given in Laslier (2006) does not allow
for a computation of the threshold for α. This is the corrected version.
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B Accuracy of the Spatial Representations
The spatial representation relies on the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the matrix of inertia
given in (4), which is derived from the estimated distances. The positions of the parties along
the ﬁrst axis of the representation are given by
√
µ1 ∗ ν1, (see Laslier, 1996) where µ1 is the
largest eigenvalue and ν1 is the corresponding eigenvector. Only the positive eigenvalues and
their corresponding eigenvectors can be used for the spatial representation of the parties, in
the sense that the dimensionality of the representation is constrained by the number of positive
eigenvalues. The cosines of the projection computed according to (5) serve as a measure of
the quality of the representation (detailed values are reported in the Supplementary Online
Materials).
Party Vote, Messel. If α = 3.69, which is the (rounded) lower bound derived from (3) in
order for all estimated distances to be positive, the ﬁrst seven eigenvalues are real and positive.
We can then explain about 65% of the inertia with a projection on three dimensions.17 The
cosines of the projection indicate that most of the parties are well-represented (values from
0.737 to 0.995 with three dimensions). The only exception is the Family Party (value of 0.55),
which would require more dimensions.
Party Vote, Konstanz. Equation (3) delivers a bound α ≥ 3.72 for all model distances to
be positive. With α = 3.72, the ﬁrst nine eigenvalues are real and positive. As mentioned
in the text, with three dimensions we only explain about 57% of the inertia.18 The cosines
of projection for the Greens (0.627 with three dimensions), the Pirate Party (0.422), and the
Animal Protection Party (0.612) are rather low. Especially the Pirate Party and the Animal
Protection Party require even more than four dimensions.
Candidate Vote, Messel. For all distances to be positive the policy salience parameter has
to be larger than or equal to 3.84. With α = 3.84, the ﬁrst six eigenvalues of the analysis are
real and positive. With three dimensions, we explain about 69% of the inertia.19 Further, all
eight candidates seem to be well-represented with only three dimensions, as indicated by the
cosines of the projection (values from 0.758 to 0.968).
Candidate Vote, Konstanz. The threshold value for α such that all model distances are
positive is equal to 2.55. With α = 2.55, the ﬁrst four eigenvalues are real and positive. With
three dimensions, we obtain an explained inertia of 98%.20 All candidates are well-represented
with only three dimensions, as indicated by the cosines of the projection (all values above
0.9796).
1736.77%, 53.97%, 65.47%, and 75.58% with one, two, three, and four dimensions, respectively.
1824.23%, 45.08%, 57.42%, and 66.78% with one, two, three, and four dimensions, respectively.
1935.46%, 58.27%, 72.60%, and 83.62% with one, two, three, and four dimensions, respectively.
2053.97%, 91.36%, 98.34%, and 100.00% with one, two, three, and four dimensions, respectively.
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C Wahl-O-Mat questionnaire items
1. Prolong the life-span of nuclear power plants.
2. Introduce a nation-wide minimal wage.
3. Immediate withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan.
4. Germany should leave the European Union.
5. No government control over top-manager salaries.
6. 6. Prohibit secret online surveillance of private computers.
7. The ﬁrst university degree should be free of tuition fees.
8. Obligatory language test for all children of preschool age.
9. Unexceptionally ban of experiments on animals.
10. Equity holding of the government in private banks should to be temporary.
11. No trade relations with governments who violate human rights.
12. There should be a quota for women in leading positions.
13. Decrease corporate taxes.
14. Introduce referenda at the federal level.
15. Parents not using public daycare facilities should be compensated.
16. Guarantee an apprenticeship training position for every adolescent.
17. Relax protection against dismissals.
18. Turkey should be a full member of the European Union.
19. Introduce a general speed limit on German highways.
20. Financial aid (BAFOEG) for students and trainees regardless of parent income.
21. Reintroduce the Deutsche Mark (German pre-Euro currency).
22. More subsides for eco-farming.
23. German politics should follow Christian values.
24. Exclusive governmental ownership of railways.
25. Retain the compulsory military service.
26. Authorize production of genetically modiﬁed food.
27. Full adoption rights for homosexual couples.
28. Reintroduce a wealth tax.
29. Leave the education policy under the authority of the states.
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30. Less restriction on asylum policy.
31. Abolish quarterly fee for medical visits.
32. If wages decease, pensions can be reduced.
33. General export prohibition of military materials.
34. Maintain the 3-types of schooling system with diﬀerent access to further education.
35. Municipal voting rights for foreign permanent residents.
36. Signiﬁcantly increase unemployment beneﬁts.
37. Allow domestic use of German military forces to ﬁght terrorism.
38. The German democracy is the best form of government.
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D Figures
(a) Messel, Dimensions 1 and 2
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(b) Messel, Dimensions 1 and 3
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(c) Konstanz, Dimensions 1 and 2
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(d) Konstanz, Dimensions 1 and 3
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Figure 1: Spatial representations Party Vote. Sub-ﬁgures (a) and (b) show the three-
dimensional projection of the seven-dimensional party representation, Messel. Sub-ﬁgures (c)
and (d) show the three-dimensional projection of the the nine-dimensional party representation,
Konstanz.
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(a) Messel, Dimensions 1 and 2
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(b) Messel, Dimensions 1 and 3
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(c) Konstanz, Dimensions 1 and 2
Dimension 1
D
im
en
si
on
 2 Greens
SPD
CDU
FDP
Left
NPD
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1−
1
−
0.
5
0
0.
5
1
(d) Konstanz, Dimensions 1 and 3
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Figure 2: Spatial representations Candidate Vote. Sub-ﬁgures (a) and (b) show the three-
dimensional projection of the six-dimensional candidate representation, Messel. Sub-ﬁgures (c)
and (d) show the three-dimensional projection of the four-dimensional candidate representation,
Konstanz.
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(a) Spatial approval Voting
Socio−Economic Dimension
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(b) W-NOMINATE
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(c) Party Vote Konstanz
Socio−Economic Dimension
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Figure 3: Spatial representations using the 2009 Wahl-O-Mat Data in sub-ﬁgures (a) and (b),
and the Konstanz Party Vote in sub-ﬁgure (c). Spatial Approval Voting: Party x and y
have one association if both explicitly approve of one item in the Wahlomat 2009 questionnaire.
W-NOMINATE: Responses to the Wahl-O-Mat 2009 questionnaire items are treated as roll
call data (Coding: I agree - Yay; I disagree - Nay; Neutral - Missing). Party Vote Kon-
stanz: Socio-Economic Dimension - Dimension 2 of Figure 1 (c); Cultural Dimension - Inverse
Dimension 1 of Figure 1 (c).
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